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The paper describes and evaluates unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) – a 
relatively new and not well-known way of providing unemployment benefits. The UISAs 
reduce work disincentives by allowing recipients to keep their own unused unemployment 
contributions, and offer the possibility to extend coverage to informal sector workers. In 
addition, if integrated with mandatory pension systems (and even social pensions), UISAs 
can be rapidly deployed and at a low cost, thus becoming a realistic tool to protect workers 
from the effects of the financial crisis.   Even during normal times, the integration with the 
pension system – and social security in general – would give more flexibility to individuals 
in the management of short and long term savings (i.e., pension wealth) while avoiding 
unnecessary administrative costs. The paper discusses issues related to incentives, 
redistribution, and viability, and outlines a policy framework for design and implementation.  
It argues that the UISAs system is especially attractive for developing countries, where the 
“self-policing” nature of the system is particularly important given a much larger informal 
sector and weaker administrative capacity in comparison to developed countries.   
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Savings for Unemployment in Good or Bad Times: Options for Developing Countries 





Many developing countries are considering the introduction of unemployment benefit 
schemes. Traditionally, the incidence of unemployment benefit (UB) programs has been 
strongly related to the level of development of a country (Vodopivec, 2004 and 2006).   
Increasingly, however, even lower middle-income countries such as Jordan, the Philippines, 
and Sri Lanka are contemplating the introduction of some form of UB system.  The reasons 
are twofold.  First, countries are being more exposed to foreign markets and are thus 
becoming more vulnerable to global financial and economic crises.  And the current financial 
crisis has shown that the majority of low and middle income countries does not have in place 
a system to provide adequate income protection to most workers in the case of job loss.  
Second, in developing countries, the balance between job and worker protection is tilted in 
the favor of the former.  The introduction of a UB program is viewed as paving the way to 
reform overly restrictive employment protection legislation.  In essence, removing 
excessively restrictive severance pay (and dismissal) regulation would not only boost the 
creation of more and better jobs, but also improve job prospects for vulnerable groups 
(Kugler, 2004 and 2005). Because reducing job protection is an extremely sensitive task, 
such reforms can often only be implemented if accompanied with a more robust income 
protection system for workers – and the introduction of an UB program is arguably the best 
option.   
Unfortunately, introducing UB to developing countries is not an easy task.
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Employees and employers contribute to a common pool: when contributing workers become unemployed, 
conditional on a certain vesting period, they can withdraw earnings-related benefits for a given period of time.     2 
pooling type) unemployment insurance (UI) provides good protection to formal sector 
workers and can help reduce poverty, it suffers from two major weakness: (i) leaves out 
informal sector workers, and (ii) creates moral hazard that increases work disincentives and 
thus imposes important efficiency costs.
2
Figure 1: Survival in Unemployment of UI Recipients, Slovenia, Before (Solid Line) and 
After (Dotted Line) the Legislative Change of Potential Benefit Duration 
 In Slovenia, for example, the shortening of the 
potential duration of UI benefits reduced substantially the length of the unemployment spell 
of recipients (see Figure 1).  















































Source: van Ours and Vodopivec [2008]. 
Note: The study uses a ‘natural experiment’ – the October 1998 change of the Slovenian UI law – that reduced 
the potential benefit duration for the group shown above from 18 to 9 months.  (The shortening of the potential 
benefit duration had no detectable effect on wages, the probability of securing a permanent rather than a 
temporary job, or the duration of the post-unemployment job – see van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008.) 
 
A standard, OECD-type UI system is therefore not a good fit for developing 
countries: not only do these countries have vast informal sectors whose workers would be left 
out of the UI system, they also have much weaker administrative capacity than developed 
countries.  Because checking benefit eligibility imposes large informational and institutional 
demands, particularly under abundant and diverse employment opportunities in the 
                                                           
2 For a summary of UI performance in developed and transition countries, see Holmlund [1998] and Vodopivec 
et al. [2005], respectively.   3 
unobservable informal sector, the resulting weak monitoring would make the incentive 
problem of the standard UI system much worse (Vodopivec, 2009). 
This paper argues  that to provide adequate income protection to a majority of 
workers without damaging work incentives developing countries should consider the so-
called unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) design. These accounts reduce 
work disincentives by allowing recipients to keep their own unused unemployment 
contributions and offer the possibility to extend coverage to informal sector workers.  In 
addition, if integrated with mandatory pension systems (and even social pensions), UISAs 
could be deployed rapidly and at a low cost, thus becoming a realistic tool to protect workers 
from the effects of the financial crisis.   Even during normal times, the integration with the 
pension system – and social security in general – would give more flexibility to individuals 
in the management of short and long term savings (i.e., pension wealth), while avoiding 
unnecessary administrative costs.     
The paper is organized in seven sections.  The next section describes in more detail 
how UISAs work. Sections 3 and 4 then deal respectively with issues related to incentives, 
redistribution, and institutional viability; and key policy choices that countries need to make 
in terms of the mandate of the system, payment and credit arrangements, the design of a 
redistributive component, and the related financing mechanism (including the pension wealth 
when available).  Sections 5 and 6 discuss in turn how UISAs could be rapidly implemented 
across countries to provide income protection to unemployed workers in times of crisis; and 
what the key institutional arrangements would be.  The main messages from the paper are 
summarized in Section 7.  A Technical Annex is also included, which uses a three period 
consumption/savings model and simulations of labor market transitions between employment 
and unemployment to show how reducing restrictions in the use of the pension wealth to 
finance unemployment benefits can increase welfare.   4 
2. How Do UISAs Work? 
Unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a relatively new program, 
although Brazil has used them since the 1960s. More recently, several other Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) 
have introduced UISAs (see Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta, 2009). 
The general operation of UISAs is straightforward and transparent. Employers 
deposit some specified fraction of each worker’s earnings in a special individual savings 
account on a regular basis (see Annex 1 for a description of the stylized features of UISAs in 
selected Latin American countries). In Chile workers are also required to make regular 
contributions to their accounts. Upon separation – and in most countries, regardless of the 
reason for separation – workers can make withdrawals from their savings accounts as they 
deem fit (some programs allow access before separation for health, education, and housing). 
In Brazil workers can access their accounts only in the case of involuntary separation, and 
employers are required to make an additional payment of 40 percent of the account balance 
to the individual. In all countries, positive account balances are added to old-age pensions at 
retirement.  
Several types of UISA programs can be distinguished:  
•  Pure UISA program, in which withdrawals are strictly limited by the balance of 
the  UISA  that is, the balance on an individual’s UISA must always be 
nonnegative. This program is identical to a prefunded severance pay program. 
•  UISA-cum-borrowing,  in which within predetermined limits, individuals can 
borrow money beyond their UISA balances. 
•  UISA-cum-solidarity fund, in which upon depletion of their own accounts, 
individuals may receive payments from the solidarity fund (see Annex 2 for a 
description of the Chilean system introduced in 2002). 
The last two programs combine self-insurance with public insurance. The self-
insurance mechanism via mandatory savings is complemented by other mechanisms to   5 
improve the adequacy of protection. The second program (UISA-cum-borrowing) does so by 
allowing workers, at least temporarily, to run into the red in their UISAs.  Under certain 
circumstances (e.g., upon retirement) the repayment of such borrowing can be subsidized, i.e. 
this mechanism also allows for redistribution across plan members.  In the case of the third 
program (USIA-cum-solidarity fund), self-insurance is augmented with an explicit 
redistributive component.  
To improve both welfare and efficiency,  UISAs can be combined with pension 
programs to provide protection against both unemployment and old age.  Benefits are 
financed via a combination of withdrawals from an individual savings account (on which a 
worker accumulates his/her contributions for unemployment as well as for old-age pensions) 
and, under certain circumstances, also from a public UI (which operates on a pay-as-you-go 
basis). Stiglitz and Yun [2005] show that such a system can offer not only a superior 
provision of insurance and thus consumption smoothing but also significantly reduce 
disincentives as compared to the traditional UI system. Stiglitz and Yun [2008] also argue 
that in the case of countries committed to the universal provision of a minimum old-age 
pension guarantee, an unemployment insurance mechanism with borrowing against the 
pension wealth could be extended to provide coverage to informal sector workers as well.  
We develop these ideas later to prepare a response to the financial crisis (see also Annex 3). 
It is also possible, in principle, to combine other risks under one integrated program. 
This allows pooling of the self-insurance component and reducing the amount of savings 
necessary for providing the same insurance under separate programs.  Thus, there are 
proposals to include other social risks such as disability and health under the same roof.  
Under certain conditions these integrated systems are welfare improving (Orszag et al., 
1999). Ultimately, the integration of risk management across the various social insurance 
components and the pooling of financial resources can offer better consumption smoothing, 
thus welfare improvement, outcomes over the life-cycle.   6 
3. Incentives, Redistribution, and Viability 
UISAs can provide important benefits by improving work incentives and allowing 
informal sector workers to join the UB system.  Yet, potential drawbacks exist too.  Because 
it does not allow for redistribution – at least in the case of the pure UISA – the system may 
offer too little protection to individuals with low savings capacity.  In addition, there are 
concerns about the institutional demands to manage and administer the system and the level 
of development of the financial sector required to invest efficiently the savings of workers.  
This section discusses the extent of these benefits and potential costs.    
Incentives 
The main rationale and key advantage of a UISA program over traditional UI is its 
potential for improving the incentives of job seekers and employed workers.  As several 
theoretical articles show, UISAs can radically change workers’ incentives.  Indeed, the 
system increases both the on-the-job effort of employed workers and the job search effort of 
unemployed workers (Orszag and Snower, 2002; Orszag et al., 1999).  Thus, by internalizing 
the costs of unemployment benefits, UISAs avoid (or at least severely limit) the moral hazard 
inherent in traditional unemployment insurance.  As a result, they have the potential to 
substantially decrease overall unemployment.  In addition, the absence of redistribution 
within the core system lowers the tax component of the social security contribution, which 
can raise employment levels (Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta, 2009).  Finally, simulations 
based on a behavioral model show that UISAs can increase contribution densities relative to 
UI both among high and low income workers (Robalino et al., 2009). 
Another way of looking at the improved incentives is noting that the UISA system is 
based on lifetime income, not current income, which is much more volatile. By doing so, it 
enables workers to self-finance shorter unemployment spells and reserves public funds to be 
targeted to those facing larger shocks. The system thus eliminates the “piggy-bank” function 
of unemployment insurance (redistribution across the life cycle). This redistribution 
represents the majority of spending in welfare states (Barr [2001] reports that two-thirds to   7 
three-quarters of welfare-state spending is life-cycle redistribution). Eliminating this function 
reduces taxes and disincentives.  
While empirical evidence on the incentive effects of UISAs was lacking, a recent study 
of the Chilean unemployment benefit system corroborates theoretical predictions that UISAs 
improve work incentives.    Using a mixed proportional hazard rate model, van Ours et al. 
[2009] examine the determinants of the job-finding rate of unemployment benefit recipients 
under the Chilean program and find that: (i) the larger the resources on the UISA at the start 
of the unemployment spell (and thus the lower the potential benefits from the solidarity 
fund), the higher the probability of exit from unemployment of benefit recipients; (ii) for a 
benefit recipient not using the solidarity fund, the amount of accumulation on the UISA does 
not affect the hazard rate from unemployment, suggesting that such individuals internalize 
the costs of unemployment benefits; (iii) for beneficiaries using the solidarity fund, the 
unemployment duration dependence pattern is consistent with moral hazard effects; and (iv) 
finally, for beneficiaries relying on UISAs only, the pattern is free of such effects. 
Notable other labor market and productivity effects resulting from a severance pay 
reform have also been confirmed.  Kugler [2004 and 2005] examines the effects of the 1990 
conversion of Colombia’s severance pay program into a funded severance pay with 
individual accounts and shows that the reform improved labor mobility by increasing both 
hiring and dismissals.
3
Clearly, high mandates for precautionary savings and/or low rates of return on 
savings can induce incentive problems of their own.   UISAs in this case can produce 
excessive turnover and informal work by encouraging workers to choose to  become 
unemployed (or informal workers) in order to “get their money back.”  This problem has 
been reported and analyzed in the case of the Brazilian Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de 
Servico (FGTS), where rates of return on savings are below market rates and UISAs co-exist 
 .  Moreover, Eslava et al. [2009] show that increased labor and capital 
turnover after the labor and capital market reforms in the early 1990s increased productivity, 
with the labor effect being particularly important. 
                                                           
3 Because of the way the new system was phased-in, employers reduced real wages to finance the cost of the 
transition (75–87 percent of the cost of transfers were financed in this way)   8 
with unemployment insurance (see Robalino et al., 2009; Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta, 
2009). A similar problem persists in Chile in the case of employees with fixed-term contracts 
(SAFP, 2007).  In general, the problem of a mandate for pre-cautionary savings that is too 
large is aggravated when individuals have difficulties accessing credit and thus cannot 
disave. 
UISA-cum-borrowing programs may also create incentives to “dive and run.” That 
is, workers may borrow and then withdraw from the formal sector and take a job in the 
informal sector, thereby avoiding repayment of the debt upon reemployment.   Nonetheless, 
as discussed above, one could use pension wealth as “collateral” within an integrated UISA-
pensions program.  
Redistribution 
By design, pure UISAs neither pool risks nor redistribute income.  Young workers may thus 
not be able to accumulate enough savings at the time of separation to be able to self-finance 
their unemployment spells.  Moreover, relying on self-insurance implies higher contribution 
rates than under UI and these might simply not be affordable to low income workers.  The 
potentially inadequate protection to this class of workers is the program’s most serious 
shortcoming. 
At the same time, the type of implicit redistribution that exists within classical UI 
systems is not always progressive and can be costly.  Indeed, redistribution in the UI system 
depends, in part, on take-up rates.  Because high income workers tend to have higher 
contribution densities, they are also more likely to meet eligibility conditions (for a 
discussion of the case of Brazil, see Robalino et al., 2009).  This implicit and non-targeted 
redistribution also increases the tax component of the social security contribution, which can 
have negative effects on employment (and promote informal work). 
UISA-cum-borrowing and UISAs-cum-solidarity fund, on the other hand, can 
incorporate an explicit redistributive arrangement.  This can be done through ex-ante and 
ex-post arrangements.  Ex-post arrangements involve forgiving negative account balances 
upon retirement in the UISA-cum-borrowing option and allowing workers to withdraw   9 
benefits from a solidarity fund once their unemployment savings have been depleted (such as 
in Chile).  Ex-ante arrangements imply matching the contributions that employers and 
employees make to the UISA system.  In both cases, the subsidies/transfers can be targeted to 
low income workers with limited savings capacity.  This can reduce the cost of redistribution 
and therefore the tax burden and associated distortions.  
Some simulation analyses suggest that redistribution under UISA is smaller than 
under UI.  The argument is that under UISAs a larger share of benefits is self-financed (see 
Feldstein and Altman [1998] for the United States and Vodopivec [2008] for Slovenia).  
Moreover, the distributional effects of substituting UI with UISA go in the “wrong” direction 
that is, they tend to hurt the poor.  Assuming unchanged benefits and behaviors, Feldstein 
and Altman find that individuals in all quintiles except the bottom one slightly gain from this 
substitution, and individuals in the bottom quintile slightly lose.   
This does not have to be the case if the redistributive component of the UISA is well 
designed.  On the contrary, redistribution targeted towards the lowest quintiles –  would 
actually help low income workers, turning them into the “winners” of the introduction of 
such a program.  Moreover, as mentioned above, UISAs open the door to the coverage of low 
income workers in the informal sector, the very individuals who are usually excluded from 
any form of redistribution.  This is because when redistribution is explicit and well targeted, 
its negative effects on incentives can be better controlled.  First, fewer workers would be 
affected (i.e., those below the “eligibility line”).  Second, those affected would be lower 
productivity workers with lower reservations wages and shorter unemployment spells.  Thus, 
UISAs could be extended to informal workers without large effects on employment levels 
and unemployment rates. 
Viability 
Judged by two important measuring rods – administrative requirements and the ability of 
individuals to self-insure  –  UISAs provide a viable alternative. First, the administrative 
demands of UISAs are not great, not much different from those necessary to manage a 
contributory pension system (no matter whether funded or pay-as-you-go). The main   10 
difference is in terms of administrative controls to check whether beneficiaries are keeping 
their eligibility for benefits – but as discussed below, these controls would need to be less 
stringent under UISAs.  
Second, simulation studies show that the proportion of workers that can self-insure is 
also reasonably large. The usual concern is that UISAs rely primarily on a life-cycle pooling 
of resources, with the intention to reduce the risks involved in cross-sectional pooling. For 
individuals with limited savings capacity and short contribution densities,  a savings-based 
system would not be a viable alternative to the traditional UI system without large transfers 
from the government or a payroll tax.  Simulations for the United States show that in high 
income countries this would not be an issue (Feldstein and Altman, 1998).  Indeed, over a 25 
year period only a small proportion of workers (5-7 percent) end their working life with 
negative balances.  Ultimately, the cost to taxpayers is reduced by more than 60 percent.  In 
middle income countries the prevalence of negative balances may be higher, but the level of 
transfers or the tax needed to finance the “debt” does not need to be higher than under UI.  In 
the case of Slovenia, for instance, [2008b] shows that under a modest regime, only one-
quarter of workers end their working life with negative cumulative balance, and 43 percent 
ever experience a negative UISA balance.  For more generous systems the respective 
numbers are much larger.  Nonetheless, for the same level of benefits, the explicit 
redistribution under UISA costs only 41 percent of the taxes under UI.  Indeed, under UISA 
individuals would have better incentives to contribute and as discussed above, redistribution 
can be better targeted.    
4. Designing UISAs in Developing Countries 
The previous section argued that, overall, UISAs can be a viable and 
efficient/equitable system to provide unemployment benefits.  However, the success of the 
system will ultimately depend on its design.  This section provides some guidelines regarding 
key policy choices that countries need to make.  They are related to:  (i) the mandate of the 
scheme: what benefits, for whom, and how; (ii) payment systems and credit arrangements; 
(iii) vesting periods, targeting systems, and type of transfers in the redistributive component; 
and (iv) financing mechanisms.   11 
The mandate  
In terms of benefits, there are four key parameters that define what individuals at 
different levels of income receive from the system.  These are: the replacement rate 
(insurance function), the minimum  benefit  (adequacy function), the ceiling on covered 
earnings (which implies a maximum contribution and a maximum benefit), and the duration 
of the minimum benefit.  The minimum benefit increases the replacement rate for low income 
workers.  The ceiling on covered earnings, on the other hand, reduces the replacement rate of 
middle and high income workers.  The rationale is that the latter have more capacity to 
diversify savings and make insurance arrangements outside of the mandatory system.  
Moreover, forcing high income workers to contribute on their full earnings would impose 
levels of precautionary savings that are too high (an implicit tax) and that can induce evasion 
or increase turnover (see above). 
While no universal standard exists to choose these parameters, it is desirable to start 
with modest objectives and to avoid discretion.  To the extent possible, choices should be 
based on an understanding of the nature of unemployment shocks and their impact on 
earnings.  In addition, it is important (i) to start with a conservative mandate that can then be 
gradually expanded if considered necessary (this is important both for the contributory and 
non-contributory parts of the benefits given uncertainties regarding the potential effects of 
the program on behaviors); and (ii)  to link the minimum benefit and the ceiling to real 
variables that measure standards of living in the economy.  This last point is necessary to 
reduce discretion and uncertainty about how the mandate of the system evolves over time.  
One option is to define these parameters as a function of economy-wide average earnings.  
Thus, when standards of living in the economy increase the mandate of the system is 
expanded accordingly. 
To avoid a level of precautionary savings that is too high, maximum levels of 
mandatory savings should be set.  Individuals who accumulate balances in their 
unemployment account above this maximum would be allowed to withdraw benefits and/or 
stop contributing.  The limit, for instance, could be a capital that finances 6-12 months of 
benefits (given the targeted replacement rate).   12 
Finally, in terms of the covered population, UISAs offer the potential to gradually 
delink coverage from the labor contract.  Initially coverage would focus on formal sector 
wage earners with open-ended contracts.  These workers are already part of the social 
insurance system and are considered a more stable/predictable group.  Yet, the real social 
benefit of income protection systems comes from covering individuals with limited savings 
capacity  (unskilled self-employed workers and wage earners in small firms including 
informal ones) who face higher unemployment risks and have less resources to self-insure.  
As discussed above, UISAs can be extended to these groups because UISAs allow for the 
separation of insurance and redistributive functions of the system.  If the latter is modest and 
well targeted, it can reduce moral hazard and contain fiscal costs (see also Robalino and 
Sanchez-Puerta, 2009). 
Payment arrangements 
In general, it is preferable that benefit payments take the form of monthly installments 
and not lump sums.  If the focus of the system is on consumption smoothing, in part because 
of individual myopia, there is no good justification to pay benefits as a lump sum.  Doing so 
can provide incentives to increase turnover or informal work.  Moreover, if savings are 
mismanaged individuals might not have adequate income protection during the entire 
unemployment spell. 
Also, there is little rationale to allow unemployment savings (below the maximum 
capital) to be used to finance investments or cover other life events.  As discussed in the 
previous section, giving this flexibility provides incentives for higher turnover.  Moreover, it 
reduces the level of precautionary savings necessary to manage adequately unemployment 
risks.  If additional arrangements are needed to promote savings or provide access to credit, 
specific instruments, not related to the unemployment benefit system, should be considered.   13 
Credit and the use of pension wealth 
UISA systems can also allow workers to “borrow,” although ideally the individual’s 
pension wealth
4
The opportunity to “borrow” can preclude increases in often already high social 
security contributions and, in general, improve individuals’ well being by giving them the 
possibility to tap into long term savings.  As pointed out earlier, the key weakness of a pure 
UISA scheme is the inadequate protection towards those plan members who do not save 
enough before becoming unemployed.  A high contribution rate can accelerate savings, but 
very likely at the cost of an increased tax wedge.  At the same time, reallocating revenues 
from other branches of the social security is seldom feasible; it would require adjusting 
benefits levels in systems that tend to be already insolvent. 
 would serve as collateral.  As mentioned, individuals could borrow when 
the balance in the individual account is not enough to cover the targeted replacement rate, 
after taking into account the minimum benefit (or unemployment subsidy).  To avoid default 
on the debt and incentives to evade the system, individuals would have the option to repay 
from the existing pension wealth.  The implication is that borrowing could only take place 
when the pension wealth is above a certain minimum. For example, the Jordanian UISA 
proposal imposes a borrowing limit equivalent to three times the individual’s monthly wage 
in order to avoid overleveraging of the pension wealth.  
Even if the allocation of the contribution rate between unemployment and pension 
benefits is “balanced,” allowing individuals to borrow (or simply consume) pension wealth 
while unemployed is welfare increasing.  This is shown formally in Annex 3. 
The redistributive component 
The key choices are related to the vesting period, targeting mechanisms, and whether 
to use ex-ante or ex-post transfers. 
                                                           
4  The pension wealth is the present value of the pension benefit cash flow calculated based on pension 
contributions made up-to-date.  In case of a defined contribution (DC) pension scheme, the pension wealth 
equals to the individual’s pension account balance. The calculation is more complicated in the case of a DB 
system, but it is also possible.  Individuals in DB plans, for instance, would receive slightly lower defined 
benefit (DB) pensions until the UISA debt is fully repaid.   14 
Having in place a minimum vesting period is important to improve incentives to 
contribute and control costs.  This vesting period is not necessary in the case of the 
contributory part of the benefit (which is self-financed) but, as in the case of UI, it is a must 
for the redistributive part.  The longer the vesting period, the higher the savings that 
individuals accumulate, the lower the take-up rate and, therefore, the lower the demand for 
subsidies.  At the same time, vesting periods that are too long imply that workers go through 
long periods without adequate protection.  Vesting periods ranging between six months and 
one year could be considered.  The choice will have to be determined, in part, by the duration 
of the subsidized benefit (see previous subsection).  The longer the duration, the longer the 
vesting period would need to be (for a more rigorous discussion see also Chapter 5 in 
Robalino et al. [forthcoming]).  
It is also important to allocate transfers (subsidies) based on a resource test.  Indeed, 
for a given level and duration of the transfer, a resource test reduces fiscal costs; for a given 
budget, it allows concentrating resources on those that need them the most.  Clearly, resource 
tests also impose costs.  First, they introduce an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) for 
individuals close to the eligibility line, who could then reduce labor supply.  Also, the system 
is more expensive to administer.  The first problem, however, is less important when the 
transfer is modest (it affects less people) and, in any case, it can be mitigated by a gradual 
withdrawal of the transfer, or a claw-back rate (Piggot et al., 2009).  As for administration, 
targeting systems have evolved considerably and their costs plummeted.  Even low income 
countries have successfully adopted these systems to operate the now widely used 
conditional cash transfers. In developing countries where income is hardly observable but 
certain components of consumption are, it would be logical to utilize the proxy-means testing 
targeting systems built for social safety net programs also for the subsidies associated with 
the UISA system.  The challenge is to find the set of observable consumption components 
(and individual characteristics) that could effectively identify individual and household 
positions in the income distribution for layers above the poorest that is, those with existing 
but limited savings capacity.   15 
Regarding ex-post versus ex-ante transfer there is still no definite answer.  In 
principle, ex-ante interventions can improve incentives for work and reduce the economic 
cost of the system.  The reason being that ex-post transfers (say a minimum benefit paid for 
two months after the balance in the individual account has run out)  impose a tax on 
individuals who exit unemployment with positive account balances (an EMTR on the 
transfer).  There are thus incentives to prolong the unemployment spell.  An alternative is to 
pay the transfer ex-ante, when the individual is still working.  For instance, for each day of 
contribution to the income protection system the government could offer a match of one day 
up to a total of one or two months.  This design would be more cost effective if it shortens 
the unemployment spell.  The incentive is there because individuals that maintain a short 
unemployment spell keep the transfer for future consumption (Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta, 
2009) – and as mentioned, the Chilean experience provides an empirical confirmation of such 
incentives. The idea is similar to the reemployment grant used by the Employment Insurance 
Fund in Korea where individuals who find a job are allowed to receive half of their 
“remaining” unemployment benefits. Another important feature of ex-ante transfers is that 
they these would be less dependent from the business cycle.  
Financing mechanisms 
In pure UISAs, worker and employer contributions feed the accounts and future 
benefits are fully funded (i.e., contributions are invested in financial assets).  Nevertheless, in 
practice, the choices are more complicated.  First, the UISAs can be pay-as-you-go or 
notional (NUSAs), which can reduce the level of the contribution rate and fiscal costs.  
NUSAs do not require a structure that manages the assets of the system and can be 
implemented even when the financial sector is underdeveloped.  Second, important choices 
need to be made in terms of how to finance the redistributive component (e.g., payroll taxes, 
general revenues, or a dismissal tax).  
NUSAs operate like UISAs but contributions during a given period of time can be 
used to pay benefits – they are not invested in financial assets.  They are the equivalent of the 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system, a DC design with pay-as-you-go financing, in 
pensions.  Contributions are still registered in individual accounts on a computer as an   16 
accounting entry.  Yet, instead of being used to purchase financial assets, contributions can 
be used to pay current benefits.  One way to think about this financing method is as if the 
government was borrowing the contribution revenues from the UISA scheme and in 
exchange, issuing government bonds to the UISA scheme:  the government would then use 
the borrowed revenues to finance transfers to the UISA system. In fact, if the government 
bonds representing the borrowing are truly issued (the equivalent to the Buchanan bond in 
pensions), then the expressions “funded” and “pay-as-you-go” become relative and the 
government’s implicit obligations borne in the scheme become explicit.  
One potential advantage of NUSAs is that they can reduce the contribution rate to the 
system.  Assume that all individuals face the same unemployment risks (i.e., the 
heterogeneity of the unemployment risk structure imposes no systematic redistribution).  
Individuals could continue to pay a contribution close to the one used in the case of classical 
unemployment insurance, since the surpluses of some accounts can be used to pay the 
deficits of others (contributions are not invested in financial assets).  Upon retirement a 
negative balance could be financed through a combination of “excess” pension wealth and an 
explicit tax (see below).  Yet, if the system is well designed, only a minority of individuals 
would retire at a given point in time.  Thus, the sum of the contribution rate and the tax could 
still be below the total contribution rate of an equivalent funded UISA scheme.  The only 
condition is that the rate of return on the individual accounts takes the growth rate of wages 
and the liabilities of the system into account (for a more detailed discussion see Robalino and 
Bodor, 2009). 
Even if the contribution rate is set at the same level as in the case of funded UISAs, 
NUSAs can facilitate the financing of temporary borrowing and the redistributive 
component.  This is simply due to the fact that the social security system and/or the 
government can use revenues from the contributions to lend unemployment benefits and/or 
finance unemployment transfers.  Clearly, the government in this case would be creating a 
liability with the NUSA system that would need to be properly accounted for and, at some 
point, repaid.  The same philosophy applies in the case of an NDC system with contributions 
invested in government bonds (Robalino and Bodor, 2007).    17 
Regarding the financing of the redistributive component, choices will depend on the 
coverage of the unemployment benefits system.  There are essentially three mechanisms to 
finance the transfers:  (i) payroll taxes and social security contributions, (ii) the general 
budget, or (iii) ear marks, which could also be considered part of general budget.  If coverage 
is large, it would be more efficient to rely on a combination of general revenues and the 
proceedings of a dismissal tax.  Indeed, a payroll tax would increase the tax wedge (with 
negative impacts on employment) as well as increase the earnings gap between formal and 
informal jobs, thus promoting informality.  There are, on the other hand, good reasons to use 
a dismissal tax, which internalizes the social costs of dismissals (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003 
and 2004; Baumann and Stahler, 2006). Conversely, if coverage is low and focused 
predominantly on formal sector workers, using general revenues can be regressive.  In this 
case, financing redistribution within the system (probably also including the dismissal tax) 
would be the best way to go. 
5. How UISA-Cum-Borrowing Systems Can Serve as a Rapid Response to Economic 
Crisis 
Vesting periods delay the payment of benefits to the program’s first recipients well 
beyond the introduction of the program, so setting up a new unemployment benefit program 
can hardly be considered as a part of a rapid response to an economic crisis.  
Unemployment benefit (UB) programs typically require a minimum contribution period of 6-
12 months so as to limit program abuse.  This means that typically the payment of 
unemployment benefits to the program’s first recipients endures a substantial lag following 
the introduction of a UB scheme:   the introduction of a UB scheme, in general, can hardly be 
considered as a rapid crisis response. 
However, a UISA-cum-borrowing scheme backed by an existing pension scheme 
could start paying benefits within a short period of time, and thus could serve as a rapid 
response to crisis.  In line with the arguments outlined above, for those countries that do not 
have but would like to introduce an UB program in response to the emerging crisis, a rapid 
introduction of UISAs backed by the pension wealth is an option.  The proposed scheme 
could work as follows. Upon being laid off, workers enrolled in social security would   18 
become entitled to borrow, under certain conditions and up to a predetermined threshold, 
from their USIAs established under the new UB program.  Their accumulated pension wealth 
would act as collateral and perhaps also as a source of funding.  By relying on past social 
security contributions as a qualifying condition, such a scheme could be made operational in 
a short time frame, and could eventually be transformed to a permanent scheme by 
mandating regular (worker and employer) contributions. Because such an arrangement would 
piggyback on the existing administrative capacity of the social security system to deliver 
unemployment benefits, it could be implemented quickly (for example, in 4-6 months). 
Note that the unemployment benefit scheme introduced this way would be sustainable 
as workers would repay the scheme primarily from future employment income and 
secondarily from future pensions that is, at a time when the crisis has subsided. Moreover, 
instead of the government assuming the burden of the stimulus by issuing government debt, 
and then repaying the debt via future tax revenues, this mechanism allows credit-constrained 
individuals to do the borrowing themselves at a time when credit is even more scarce than 
usual (see also Annex 3). 
6. Implementing and Managing UISAs 
UISAs initially evolved in Latin American countries where pension reforms 
established privately managed pension funds. More developed capital markets, more 
government oversight, and stronger institutional capacity created the ideal environment for 
UISAs.   Still, in developing countries with publicly run pension schemes, the case can be 
made for piggybacking on the administrative capacities of the pension (or broader social 
security) administration. 
The Chilean UISA-cum-solidarity fund mechanism is run by a private provider 
selected through a competitive bidding process.  The provision of services associated with 
the UISA scheme is defined by a contract between the government and the selected provider 
for a period of 10 years.  This contract specifies all the related activities in detail spanning 
from contribution collection via customer service, to benefit processing, records, and 
investment management, etc.  The provider is selected based on an established record of   19 
having offered similar services in the area of pensions long before the introduction of the 
UISA scheme.  The government oversight related to the implementation of the contract is 
carried out by the Pension Supervisory Agency.  The Chilean administrative model could be 
followed by developing countries with developed capital markets and privately run 
mandatory pension schemes, a rarely existing precondition. 
An alternative is to allow the public pension administration handle the administration 
of UISAs. The main business processes in the administration of UISAs are as follows: (i) 
contribution collection, (ii) account management, (iii) benefit processing, (iv) investment 
management, and (v) assistance in job search.   Contribution collection for other social 
insurance components is already in place in countries with contributory pension systems and 
adding an additional component to the payroll deductions would be easy.  Similarly, proper 
account management is a necessity in any well managed pension system.  Indeed, even in 
Defined Benefit system it is necessary to track the contributions and earnings of plan 
members.  Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) pension schemes also require individual 
account-based record keeping.
5
Regarding job status verification, there is no need to impose a massive burden in 
terms of monitoring. This is because UISAs severely limit the incentives to abuse the system.   
What is necessary is to involve (public or private) employment services focusing on job-
search assistance  and retraining in the context of an integrated Labor Market Risks 
Management (LMRM) system.  To design these programs, policymakers can build on the 
positive experiences of a few Latin American countries (see Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta for 
a review). Hence, instead of trying to monitor employment and job search, the emphasis 
  In terms benefit processing there are no major differences 
either.  There are issues that could emerge, however, if there is no institutional capacity and 
good governance to properly manage and invest the savings accumulated in the individual 
accounts.  When this is the case, however, countries can consider having pay-as-you-go 
unemployment accounts (NUSAs).  As discussed above, these would be the equivalent of 
NDCs to funded defined-contribution pensions – of financial defined contributions (FDCs) 
systems.   
                                                           
5 DB pension systems with strong correspondence between contributions and benefits can be mathematically 
identical to NDC schemes.   20 
would be on monitoring enrolment in job-search assistance and/or training programs (as 
appropriate) which is easy to enforce.   
7. Concluding Remarks 
  The paper focused on a nontraditional  –  and as claimed by the authors, so far 
underutilized  –  mechanism for providing unemployment benefits, UISAs.  It showed that 
certain designs of UISAs – especially UISAs-cum-borrowing with the pension wealth as 
collateral – have the potential of providing adequate income protection and, at the same time, 
avoiding the moral hazard present in traditional, OECD-style unemployment insurance (UI) 
programs.  Allowing the unemployed to draw resources from their UISAs when the balance 
on these accounts is negative considerably enhances welfare properties of the scheme (for 
example, it allows the receipt of benefits by workers with insufficient balances on their 
UISAs, such as young workers), and the backing of the scheme with the pension wealth 
increases flexibility in the management of savings and therefore allows the system to achieve 
its consumption smoothing function more efficiently.  The quantitative analysis conducted in 
the context of the paper showed that reducing restrictions in the use of pension wealth is 
particularly important in the case of risk averse individuals and when the unemployment rate 
is not too “high.”  At the same time, policymakers need to be careful in setting the share of 
pension wealth that can be used in the case of unemployment.  In general, there should be a 
minimum level of pension wealth that is maintained to guarantee a minimum level of income 
during old age.  Full access to pension wealth is thus not an efficient policy.  The share of 
pension wealth that can be used for unemployment would depend on the targeted minimum 
level of consumption that system offers to workers. 
The paper thus argued that UISAs are a particularly appropriate tool for developing 
countries. A standard, OECD-type UI program requires monitoring of the job search and 
labor market status of benefit recipients and therefore is not a good fit for developing 
countries that have vast informal sectors and much weaker administrative capacity than 
developed countries; moreover, such programs exclude informal sector workers. Instead of 
relying on monitoring of benefit recipients, UISAs internalize the costs of unemployment 
benefits and thus strengthen financial incentives (and this “self-policing,” as shown by new   21 
empirical evidence from Chile, indeed works) –  the feature particularly important for 
developing countries. Furthermore, UISAs offer the possibility to extend coverage to 
informal sector workers.  
Not only are UISAs an attractive option for non-crisis times, but the version that 
relies on borrowing against pension wealth also enables a rapid introduction of the program 
and can be, therefore, used to boost the incomes of unemployed workers affected by the 
current crisis. Indeed, by relying on past social security contributions as a qualifying 
condition and by utilizing existing social security capacity to deliver the benefits, such a 
scheme could be made operational in a relatively short time. 
     22 
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Annex 1: Stylized Features of UISAs from Selected Latin American Countries 
 
Table  1  summarizes the key parametric features of UISAs from selected Latin 
American countries.  Note that the unemployment benefit is paid as a lump sum in Argentina, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.  The maximum unemployment duration parameter does not 
apply in these cases. 
Also note that the contribution rates in these examples are high compared to the 
contribution rates that apply in traditional unemployment insurance (UI) systems with risk 
pooling. (Chile is a remarkable exception!)  The reason beyond the ones already discussed in 
this paper for these high contribution rates is that some of these USIA systems do not only 
target income support for a reasonably short frictional unemployment spell, but they serve as 
replacements for generous pre-existing severance pay schemes. The high contribution rates 
are necessary to match the generosity of these severance pay schemes.  The primary example 
is Columbia where the UISA scheme is really a prefunding mechanism replacing the 
severance pay scheme, which offered one monthly wage severance pay for each year of 
service.  This level of generosity is roughly equivalent to a prefunding mechanism with an 8 
percent contribution rate in cases under which the severance pay eligibility is not conditional 
on the cause of separation (see Kugler [2005] for more details). 
The existing UISA scheme that demonstrates the ability of UISAs to provide 
adequate income protection with a reasonably low contribution rate is the Chilean scheme 
(see SAFP [2007] and Acevedo et al. [2006] for details). 
Table 1: Income Replacement Rates, Contribution Rates and Maximum Benefit 
Duration of UISAs in Selected Latin American Countries 
 
 
Source: Vodopivec [2006]. 
Replacement rate (% of the 
individual's pre-
unemployment wage)
Contribution rate (employer + 








lump sum 12% (8% after first year) + 0% N/A
Brazil
lunp sum + 40% if not 
dismissed for "just cause"
8% + 0% 6
Chile 30-50% 2.4% + 0.6% 5
Colimbia lump sum 9.3% + 0% N/A
Ecuador lump sum 8% + 0% N/A
Peru lump sum 8% + 0% N/A
Uruguay 50%
hidden in total social insurance 
CR: 15% + 12.2%
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Annex 2: The Chilean UISAs-Cum-Solidarity Fund Scheme 
The Chilean UISA-cum-solidarity fund scheme was introduced in 2002.  The main 
idea of the Chilean system is to take advantage of the desirable incentive effects of pure 
UISAs as the overriding mechanism behind the scheme and to augment it with some degree 
of risk-pooling to improve the benefit adequacy for those plan members who saved little 
before they become unemployed. 
Employees and employers both contribute to the individual accounts at contribution 
rates  0.6 percent and 1.6 percent respectively.  When workers become unemployed 
(regardless of the reason for separation) they can withdraw the funds accumulated on their 
individual accounts. If the accumulation on the individual account is larger than the financing 
need for five monthly benefit payments starting at 50 percent, then gradually decreasing to 
30 percent of the covered pre-unemployment wage, then only the individual account finances 
the benefits. Alternatively, the solidarity fund augments the saving on the individual account 
to finance the five monthly benefit payments as described above.  The solidarity fund is 
financed by a contribution from employers at 0.8 percent of all the covered wages of their 
employees.  Thus, the overall contribution rate paid by employers is 2.4 percent. The 
government also contributes to the solidarity fund by a fixed annual payment.  The total 
contribution rate financing the Chilean UISA mechanism excluding the government 
contribution is 3 percent, a low rate compared to other UISA schemes in Latin America.  See 
Figure 2 for an illustration of the Chilean UISA scheme. 
Figure 2: The Chilean USIA System 
 
Source: Presentation by Eduardo Fajnzylber at the “Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Risk-
Pooling and/or Mandatory Savings” workshop organized by the World Bank’s  Human Development 
Department, Middle East and North Africa Region on May 22, 2008. 
There is an important distinction between the eligibility for benefits solely financed 
from the individual accounts and the ones co-financed by the solidarity fund.  While benefits 
solely financed by the individual account can be accessed regardless of the voluntary or 
involuntary nature of the separation, benefit payments involving the solidarity fund require 
that the worker be involuntarily laid off.   27 
A review of the first five years of the Chilean UISA system suggested that the 
generosity of the system towards fixed-term employees could be improved, that is why 
limited access to the solidarity fund was also granted to workers with fixed-term employment 
contracts in 2008.  Initially, the access to the solidarity fund was restricted to workers with 
open-ended employment contracts. 
Annex 3:  Formalizing the Welfare Effects of Restrictions in the Access to Pension 
Wealth 
 
The paper so far has discussed, intuitively, that allowing individuals to “borrow” 
against their pension wealth while unemployed can be welfare increasing.  Indeed, credit 
constrained individuals would gain by having the flexibility to access an asset previously 
inaccessible before retirement  and any concerns regarding the depletion of this pension 
wealth could be dealt with by imposing restrictions on the level of borrowing.  This section 
first formalizes this argument using a simple three period model of optimal savings.  It then 
uses simulations of real career histories to estimate the magnitude of the welfare losses 
(gains) induced by restricting access to the pension wealth to a varying degree.  
The three period model of optimal savings for pensions and unemployment 
We work with individuals that have time inconsistent preferences (which justify 
mandatory savings) and live three periods.  During the first period all consumers work, but 
they can be unemployed during the second period with a probability u.  In the last period all 
consumers are retired.   The representative consumer chooses the savings rate in period 1 and 
2 to solve the following problem:    
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚:  𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐1) + 𝗽𝗽[𝜌𝜌𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐2) + 𝜌𝜌2𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐3)],         (1) 
𝑠𝑠.𝑡𝑡.𝑐𝑐3 = [(𝑦𝑦1−𝑐𝑐1)𝑅𝑅 + 𝑦𝑦2 − 𝑐𝑐2]𝑅𝑅 
Where c represents consumption, y income, ρ captures consumers time-preferences, R=(1+r) 
where r is the interest rate, and β is a parameter capturing the degree of “myopia.”  In the 
special case of β=1 the individual exhibits time consistent preferences, i.e. the rate of time 
preference between any two consecutive periods is identical, but if β is below or above one, 
then individuals have a higher or lower discount rate between the current period and the next 
period compared to any other consecutive time periods.  Such time inconsistent preferences 
lead to under-saving or over-saving.
6
To gain insights we assume a standard constant relative risk aversion utility function 
𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐) =
𝑐𝑐1−𝜆𝜆
1−𝜆𝜆 where λ is the coefficient or risk aversion, and solve the problem recursively.  
   
                                                           
6 See Bernheim and Rangel [2007] for this type of “naïve” formulation of myopia.   28 
Hence, in period 2 consumers observe their savings 𝑘𝑘2 = (𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑐𝑐1)𝑅𝑅 and their income 𝑦𝑦2 






,            (2) 
with 𝑐𝑐3 = (𝑘𝑘2 + 𝑦𝑦2 − 𝑐𝑐2)𝑅𝑅 
This gives: 
𝑐𝑐2
−𝜆𝜆 = 𝗽𝗽𝜌𝜌𝑅𝑅[(𝑘𝑘2 + 𝑦𝑦2 − 𝑐𝑐2)𝑅𝑅]−𝜆𝜆,         (3) 
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We are then interested in characterizing optimal savings for pensions and optimal 
savings for unemployment.  Optimal savings for pensions can be simply derived by assuming 
that there is no unemployment.  Thus, normalizing income to 1, we have: 
𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝 = 1 −
(𝑅𝑅+1)
𝜓𝜓2𝜓𝜓1
,             (7) 
Deriving optimal savings with uncertainty regarding employment status in period 2 is 















�,     (8) 
where u is the probability of being unemployed in period 2.  There is no analytical solution to 
(8), but we know that the optimal level of consumption with 0<u<1 has to fall “in between” 
the level of consumption with u=0 and u=1.  Hence, one can write the optimal level of 
consumption for 0<u<1 as a weighted average of c*(u=1) and c*(u=0).  The weight is zero 
when u=0 and 1 when u=1.  In between, the weight has to increase monotonically with u.  
Indeed, other things being equal, as the probability of unemployment increases, the weight 
has to increase to reduce consumption and increase savings (see Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3:  Characterizing Optimal Consumption under Uncertainty in Employment in 
Period 2 
 
Note:  The figure is based on equation (8).  The parameter u represents the probability of 
unemployment in period 2. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
















(1 − 𝑢𝑢)𝐿𝐿1 + 𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿0 
𝑐𝑐∗(0 < 𝑢𝑢 < 1)   30 
Thus, the level of saving necessary to cover pensions plus the risk of unemployment can be 
computed as a weighted average of the levels of savings without unemployment and the 
savings with unemployment (i.e., when y=0).  We can write:   
 






�,         (9) 
where  0 ≤ 𝜇𝜇(.) ≤ 1 is an increasing function of the probability of unemployment at time 
t=2.  After simplifying we obtain: 
 






,           (10) 
Thus, the amount of savings to cover for the risk of unemployment is simply the difference 




,             (11) 
The policy question we are interested in is whether in period 2, in the “bad” state 
(unemployed), the optimal level of consumption (with unrestricted access to capital) is above 
the unemployment savings.  In this case, if there is a restriction on the use of pension wealth, 
the optimal cannot be achieved and there is a welfare loss.   
By replacing k in (4) and setting y2=0, we obtain the optimal level of consumption if 













,           (12) 
The constraint on the use of pension wealth will be welfare decreasing as long as the savings 
to finance unemployment benefits (equation 11) are not sufficient to cover the optimal level 
of consumption.  Formally, the condition for having a welfare loss if pension wealth cannot 












> 0,         (13) 
or after simplifying: 
𝜇𝜇(.) <
𝜓𝜓2𝜓𝜓1−(𝑅𝑅+1)
𝜓𝜓2−1 ,           (14)   31 
This condition does not always hold.  In particular, it does not hold when 𝜓𝜓2𝜓𝜓1 < (𝑅𝑅 + 1) 
since in that case the right hand side of the inequality is negative (since 𝜓𝜓2 > 1).  Hence, 
given R, for certain combinations of the level of risk aversion and time preferences, 
restricting the use of pension wealth does not decrease welfare.  In particular, it can be shown 
that 𝜓𝜓2𝜓𝜓1 increases when the level of risk aversion increases and/or when the rate at which 
individuals discount future consumption decreases. (see Figure 4).   
A first result therefore is that, for sufficiently risk taker individuals with high discount rates, 
condition (14) will not hold. This means that risk taker individuals who heavily discount the 
future will not be affected by restrictions on the use of pension wealth.   
On the other hand, for risk averse individuals with low discount rates (the most likely case)
 7
Hence, the second result is that for  𝜓𝜓2𝜓𝜓1 > (𝑅𝑅 + 1),  there exists an unemployment 
probability such that condition (14) holds.  The lower the unemployment rate, the more likely 
that inequality (14) will be verified and that restrictions in the use of pension wealth will be 
welfare decreasing.  Conversely, the higher the unemployment rate the less likely that 
restrictions on the use of pension wealth will matter.   
 
restrictions on the use of pension wealth can reduce welfare.  Whether this happens will 
depend on the probability of unemployment.    
The intuition behind this result is that, the higher the unemployment rate, the more savings 
will be accumulated by risk averse individuals to cover unemployment benefits, thus 
increasing the share of these savings in total savings.   Then, these savings alone can be 
sufficient to finance the optimal level of consumption when unemployed.   
                                                           
7 See Jimenez-Martin and Sanchez-Martin [2007] and Robalino et al., [2009].   32 
Figure 4:  Conditions under which Restrictions on the Use of Pension Wealth are 
Welfare Decreasing 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
To illustrate these points, we have computed optimal levels of consumption in periods 1, 2 
and 3 for λ=1.8,  ρ=0.99,  r=1.04  and  β  ranging  between  1  and  0.666.    The  results  are 
summarized in Figure 5.  All the lines give the optimal level of consumption as a function of 
1/β (the level of myopia) and two values of the unemployment rate (0 and 1).  In the first 
panel, which corresponds to period 1, the line on the top refers to the case without 
unemployment.  We see that as myopia increases, consumption increases (individuals over-
consume).  The point where β=1 gives the “socially optimal” level of consumption c* and the 
distance between 1 and c* gives the socially optimal level of savings.  The line at the bottom 
does the same for the case where individuals do not work in period 2 (y2=0).  Clearly, 
optimal savings in period 1 in this case are higher, as individuals put aside extra savings to 
deal with unemployment in period 2.  The line in “the middle” gives optimal consumption 
levels assuming an unemployment probability of 5%. The distance between Cu* and C* 
gives the additional savings that are needed to deal with the risk of unemployment.   The 
story is that, at least in principle, depending on the level of myopia (i.e., the value of the 
parameter  β) governments impose forced savings to ensure that the socially optimal level of  
savings reaches 1-Cu*.  But forced savings usually separate the savings going to the 
“pensions account” from those going to the “unemployment account.”  In our example, 
around 5 percent of total savings would be in the unemployment account and the rest in the 
pensions account.   
The right-panel of Figure 5  shows optimal consumption in periods 2 and 3 (when retired).  
For period 2 there are two cases:  the case where the individual is employed and the case 
where the individual is unemployed. When employed, restrictions on pension wealth are not 
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on top indicates the total level of savings (including forced savings).  The dotted line at the 
bottom represents only the unemployment savings.  We see that in all cases these savings are 
not enough to cover the optimal level of consumption while unemployed.  Removing that 
restriction can therefore be welfare improving. 
Figure 5:  Optimal Consumption, Optimal Savings and Restrictions on Pension Wealth 
 
Note:  In the figures λ=1.8, ρ=1/(1+0.01), r=1.04, u=0.05,  and y is set equal to one when employed. 
Source:  Authors.’ 
 
Simulating career paths and the welfare impact of restrictions on the use of pension 
wealth 
 
In reality, determining what is the optimal level of saving for various risks is very 
difficult – particularly given that individuals have heterogeneous preferences.   In practice, 
the mandates of the various social insurance programs across countries are determined by the 
political process.  The necessary contribution rates (forced savings) are set accordingly.  The 
more relevant question in this case is how policymakers should set (i) the replacement rate 
for unemployment benefits, and (ii) the share of pension wealth that can be used in the case 
of unemployment; given (i) the contribution rate and its allocation between pensions and the 
unemployment account, and (ii) transitions in and out of unemployment. 
To address these questions we set up a simple model where representative individuals 
can be followed, month by month, starting at the time they enter the labor market, through 
retirement, until death.  While active, individuals can transit between employment and 
unemployment according to a Markov process given by a matrix 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  which gives the 
transition probabilities between states i and j.  Both i and j can take on the values 1 (if 
employed) and 0 (if unemployed).  The time t* of retirement, expressed in number of 
months, is defined exogenously.   While employed at time t individuals earn a salary given 
by 𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑤𝑤(0)(1 + 𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡 where g is the monthly growth rate of wages.  If unemployed, 
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Maximum level of consumptionin period 2 if unemployed with restricted access to pension wealth  (including forced savings)  34 
𝜂𝜂(𝑘𝑘 − 𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢)� where α is the replacement rate for unemployment benefits and η is the share of 
pension wealth that can be used to finance unemployment benefits.  When retired, on the 
other hand, individuals receive a pension 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡 > 𝑡𝑡 ∗) = 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡 ∗)/𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡 ∗)  where a(t*) is the 
annuity factor at the age of the individual at time t*.   
It is assumed that individuals consume all their net salaries (i.e., salaries after paying social 
security contributions) and unemployment and pension benefits.  Hence, all savings are 
related to the mandatory contributions to the social security system.  In this case, the 
dynamics of total and unemployment savings before retirement are given by: 
𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = (𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜏𝜏.𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡))(1 + 𝑟𝑟) 
𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�0,(𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜏𝜏𝑢𝑢.𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡))(1 + 𝑟𝑟)� 
where r is the interest rate on savings and τ and τu are respectively the total contribution rate 
to the social security and the contribution rate that finances unemployment benefits.  We 
notice that when individuals are allowed to use part of the pension wealth then B(t) can be 
higher than ku – thus the restriction is that ku>0.   
We  use  the  model  to  simulate  the  welfare  impact  of  alternative  combinations  of  α 
(0.3,0.4,…,0.7) and η (0,0.1,…,1) given 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  We use three transition probabilities between 
employment and unemployment:  0.01, 0.02, and 0.05.  As a reference, estimates of these 
probabilities for formal sector workers in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are:  0.0095, 0.0111, 
and 0.0058 respectively (see Robalino and Zylberstajn, [2009]).  To put things in perspective, 
a 0.01 monthly probability of unemployment implies that roughly 10 percent of workers 
become unemployed within a year, while a 0.05 monthly probability of unemployment 
implies that half of workers become unemployed during the year.  Regarding the transition 
out of unemployment we use a constant 0.25 probability.  This is more or less equivalent to 
an average unemployment duration of 3 months.  In addition, we fix the real growth rate of 
wages (g=0.03/12), the real interest rate (r=0.04/12), and the contribution rates (τ=0.15 and 
τu=0.08).  Welfare is measured with the same utility function used in the previous section 
setting λ=1.5 (i.e., we focus on risk averse individuals) and ρ=1/(1+r).  
The results of the simulation are summarized in Figure 6.  In each panel, the different lines 
are associated with a given replacement rate for unemployment benefits.  The lines give the 
average (across 1,000 realizations of Monte Carlo simulations) of the per capita present value 
of utility as a function of the share of pension wealth that can be accessed in the case of 
unemployment (η).      
     35 
The main insights from the analysis can be summarized as follows: 
•  In all cases, restricting access to pension wealth is welfare decreasing and losses can 
be considerable.  In essence, if unemployment savings are zero and individuals 
become unemployed, consumption drops to zero.  This has a dramatic negative effect 
on welfare, given the assumption of a decreasing marginal utility to consumption (i.e., 
when consumption is very low, utility is “very negative.”) 
•  At the same time, allowing myopic individuals to use 100 percent of their pension 
wealth can also be a bad policy.  What happens in the model in this case is that when 
individuals become unemployed with unemployment savings equal to zero, they can 
deplete pension wealth more rapidly and eventually drive it down to zero -- which 
again generates a level of consumption equal to zero.  For 0< η < 1, on the other 
hand, pension wealth (and therefore consumption) never becomes zero.  Clearly, as 
discussed below, this assumes that there is no minimum level of consumption, which 
in reality is not the case.       
•  In general, welfare starts to decrease rapidly after η has surpassed a given threshold – 
in our illustrations between 0.10 and 0.4.  This is because when the share of pension 
wealth that is used is low, it is more likely that it will be “spread over the 
unemployment period,” instead of reaching a level where consumption approaches 
zero – and that has an important negative effect on welfare.  It is important to note, 
however, that if a restriction existed where consumption cannot fall below a given 
minimum (say close to the poverty line) then the optimal η would increase – if not, 
the level utility would also become “very negative.”  We thus postulate that, given a 
replacement  rate  (and  the  other  model  parameters),  there  is  an  optimal  η  that 
depends  on  the  minimum  level  of  consumption.    It  is  the  minimum  η  that  allows 
individuals to keep consumption levels above this minimum most of the time.   36 
Figure 6:  Welfare Impact of Alternative Restrictions on the Use of Pension Wealth 
Transition probability into unemployment = 0.01 
 
Transition probability into unemployment = 0.02 
 
Transition probability into unemployment = 0.05 
   
Note: Right panels provide a zoom of the left panels for 0<η<1. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
•  Similarly, we observe that the higher the replacement rate the lower the level of 
welfare and the more negative the slope of the lines (i.e., the more rapidly utility 
declines as η increases).  Again, this is because, given η, the higher the replacement 
the more rapidly pension wealth can be depleted.  In the current example, 0.3 is the 




































































































































































RR=0.7  37 
was a level of consumption below which the utility became “very negative,” the 
minimum replacement rate would have to increase.  
•  Finally  we  see  that  the  effects  of  α  and  η  on welfare are less important when 
transition probabilities into unemployment fall.  Or, given the duration of 
unemployment, this is equivalent to a decrease in the unemployment rate. This is 
simply because individuals would spend less time unemployed and therefore would 
be less likely to deplete pension wealth.  The obvious implication is that policymakers 
need to be more careful in choosing α and η when unemployment rates are high. 
In summary, the results suggests that both restricting access to pension wealth or 
allowing individuals to access pension wealth without restrictions are bad policies.  
Choices about the targeted replacement rate and the share of pension wealth that can be 
accessed in the event of unemployment should be set as low as possible to ensure that 
individuals preserve a given minimum level of consumption most of the time.    
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Summary Findings
The paper describes and evaluates unemployment insurance savings 
accounts (UISAs) – a relatively new and not well-known way of providing 
unemployment benefi  ts. The UISAs reduce work disincentives by allowing 
recipients to keep their own unused unemployment contributions, and 
off  er the possibility to extend coverage to informal sector workers. In 
addition, if integrated with mandatory pension systems (and even social 
pensions), UISAs can be rapidly deployed and at a low cost, thus becoming 
a realistic tool to protect workers from the eff  ects of the fi   nancial  crisis.   
Even during normal times, the integration with the pension system – and 
social security in general – would give more fl  exibility to individuals in 
the management of short and long term savings (i.e., pension wealth) 
while avoiding unnecessary administrative costs. The paper discusses 
issues related to incentives, redistribution, and viability, and outlines 
a policy framework for design and implementation.  It argues that the 
UISAs system is especially attractive for developing countries, where the 
“self-policing” nature of the system is particularly important given a much 
larger informal sector and weaker administrative capacity in comparison 
to developed countries.